Preference Ballots and Preference Schedules Quiz 7 of 10 How does a preference ballot give more information about a voter than a traditional ballot? A preference ballot lists candidates in order of the voter's preference, while a traditional ballot only shows the voter's first choice. A preference ballot is longer than a traditional ballot, so the preference ballot has more personal information about the voter on it. A preference ballot lists the voter's name, while a traditional ballot is completely anonymous. A preference ballot asks in-depth questions of the voter to confirm their identity.
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A preference ballot allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference, whereas a traditional ballot typically allows voters to select only their top choice. Show more…
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