A seller decides to sell an object by means of a sealed-bid second-price auction without a reservation price. There are two bidders. The seller believes that for each of the two bidders there is a probability of 1/2 that the bidder’s value for the object is $400 and a probability of 1/2 that the bidder’s value is $300. The seller believes that these probabilities are independent between bidders. If the bidders bid rationally, what is the seller’s expected revenue from the auction? $_____________
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