Consider that there is one auctioneer who would like to sell one commodity and there are 5 individuals, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The auctioneer will apply the following tie-breaking rule: If there are multiple bidders who announce the highest bid, then select the bidder with the smallest index will be picked up as the winner. (For instance, let bi = bj > bk for any k ≠ i, j. Then, i is the winner if and only if i < j.) Let each individual i's private value of the commodity, vi, is given as: v1 = $1500; v2 = $1000; v3 = $2000; v4 = $900; v5 = $800. Then, answer the following questions. (1) Suppose that the auctioneer will apply the 2nd-pricing auction rule. (1-1) Then, what strategy profile would be the dominant strategy equilibrium? Is this dominant strategy equilibrium unique in this game? Also show the reasons of your answers. (1-2) Is there any other Nash equilibrium in this game? Specify what strategy profile would be a Nash equilibrium. (2) Suppose that the auctioneer will apply the 1st-pricing auction rule. Then, specify the set of Nash equilibria in this game.