00:01
Hello student, in the given question, q1, in part a, the best response of player 2, type 1 to player 1 choosing m is to also choose m.
00:41
This is because in type 1 game, player 2 gets a higher payoff by choosing m, regardless of what player 1 chooses.
01:34
In part b, the best response of player 1 to player 2, type 1 choosing m and player 2 type 2 choosing c.
02:24
So, is to choose m with probability p and c with probability 1 -p.
02:39
Is to choose m with probability p and c with probability 1 -p.
03:07
So, this is because if player 1 chooses m, this is because player 1 chooses m with probability p and player 2 probability p and c with probability of 1 -p.
03:41
Then the player 2 gets type 1, gets a higher payoff by choosing m and player 2 type 2 gets a higher payoff by choosing c.
04:33
Now, in part c, there are two nash equilibrium in pure strategy in the game as m -m -c and c -c -m.
05:03
In the strategy profile, m -m -c is the player 1 chooses m, player 1 who chooses m and the player 2, m -m -c is the player 1 chooses m with probability 1, player 2 type 1 chooses m with probability of c...