Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach

Hal R. Varian

Chapter 28 Game Theory - all with Video Answers

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Chapter Questions

Problem 1

Consider the tit-for-tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Suppose that one player makes a mistake and defects when he meant to cooperate. If both players continue to play tit for tat after that, what happens?

Rashmi Sinha

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Problem 2

Are dominant strategy equilibria always Nash equilibria? Are Nash equilibria always dominant strategy equilibria?

Rashmi Sinha

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02:06

Problem 3

Suppose your opponent is not playing her Nash equilibrium strategy. Should you play your Nash equilibrium strategy?

Kaylee Mcclellan

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01:13

Problem 4

We know that the single-shot prisoner's dilemma game results in a dominant Nash equilibrium strategy that is Pareto inefficient. Suppose we allow the two prisoners to retaliate after their respective prison terms. Formally, what aspect of the game would this affect? Could a Pareto efficient outcome result?

Dave Kratz

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02:09

Problem 5

What is the dominant Nash equilibrium strategy for the repeated prisoner's dilemma game when both players know that the game will end after one million repetitions? If you were going to run an experiment with human players for such a scenario, would you predict that players would use this strategy?

Niamat Khuda

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05:28

Problem 6

Suppose that player $\mathrm{B}$ rather than player A gets to move first in the sequential game described in this chapter. Draw the extensive form of the new game. What is the equilibrium for this game? Does player B prefer to move first or second?

Manasvee Singh

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