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Horngren’s Cost Accounting

Srikant M. Datar, Madhav V. Rajan

Chapter 22

Management Control Systems, Transfer Pricing, and Multinational Considerations - all with Video Answers

Educators


Chapter Questions

00:46

Problem 1

What is a management control system?

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
03:07

Problem 2

Describe three criteria you would use to evaluate whether a management control system is effective

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
01:16

Problem 3

What is the relationship among motivation, goal congruence, and effort?

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator
02:29

Problem 4

Name three benefits and two costs of decentralization.

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
01:17

Problem 5

"Organizations typically adopt a consistent decentralization or centralization philosophy across all their business functions." Do you agree? Explain.

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
01:29

Problem 6

"Transfer pricing is confined to profit centers." Do you agree? Explain.

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
01:08

Problem 7

What are the three methods for determining transfer prices?

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
01:42

Problem 8

What properties should transfer-pricing systems have?

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
01:37

Problem 9

"All transfer-pricing methods give the same division operating income." Do you agree? Explain.

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
02:59

Problem 10

Under what conditions is a market-based transfer price optimal?

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
02:02

Problem 11

What is one potential limitation of full-cost-based transfer prices?

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
02:02

Problem 12

Give two reasons why the dual-pricing system of transfer pricing is not widely used.

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
01:31

Problem 13

"Cost and price information play no role in negotiated transfer prices." Do you agree? Explain.

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
02:32

Problem 14

"Under the general guideline for transfer pricing, the minimum transfer price will vary depending on whether the supplying division has unused capacity or not." Do you agree? Explain.

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
00:45

Problem 15

How should managers consider income tax issues when choosing a transfer-pricing method?

Ameer Said
Ameer Said
Numerade Educator
05:51

Problem 16

Quick Stop operates 1,000 convenience stores throughout the United States. The company's slogan is "Best Stop of the Day," and its mission is to make every customer a return customer. Ouick Stop's corporate strategy supports this mission by stressing the importance of sparkling clean surroundings, well-stocked shelves, and, above all, cheerful employees. $0 f$ course, improved shareholder value drives this strategy.
1. Assume that Quick Stop uses a balanced scorecard approach (see Chapter 12) to formulating its management control system. List three measures that Quick Stop might use to evaluate each of the four balanced scorecard perspectives: financial perspective, customer perspective, internal-business-process perspective, and learning-and-growth perspective.
2. How would the management controls related to financial and customer perspectives at Quick Stop differ between the following three employees: a store manager, a regional sales manager, and the corporation's CE0?

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator
01:23

Problem 17

Fenster Corporation manufactures windows with wood and metal frames. Fenster has three departments: glass, wood, and metal. The glass department makes the window glass and sends it to either the wood or metal department where the glass is framed. The window is then sold. Upper management sets the production schedules for the three departments and evaluates them on output quantity, cost variances, and product quality.
1. Are the three departments cost centers, revenue centers, or profit centers?
2. Are the three departments centralized or decentralized?
3. Can a centralized department be a profit center? Why or why not?
4. Suppose the upper management of Fenster Corporation decides to let the three departments set their own production schedules, buy and sell products in the external market, and have the wood and metal departments negotiate with the glass department for the glass panes using a transfer price.
a. Will this change your answers to requirements 1 and $2 ?$
b. How would you recommend upper management evaluate the three departments if this change is made?

Carson Merrill
Carson Merrill
Numerade Educator
04:41

Problem 18

Host Hotels, a small chain of business hotels in the Mid- Atlantic region, is interested in gaining access to the boutique lodging market by acquiring a hotel group in that sector. Host Hotels intends to operate the newly acquired hotels independently from the rest of its chain, while pursuing other boutique market opportunities in other cities.
One of the prospects is Bennington Properties, a group of 10 historic hotels in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. All hotels in the group include the name "Bennington," as in Mainline Bennington, Georgetown Bennington, etc. Buying for all 20 hotels is done by the company's central office. Hotel managers must follow strict guidelines for all aspects of hotel management in an attempt to maintain consistency across locations. Hotel managers are evaluated on the basis of achieving profit goals developed by the central office.
The other prospect is Eastern Innkeepers, a group of 25 spa retreats, bed and breakfasts, and countrin inns in rural Virginia and North Carolina. Each property in the group was previously an independently owned company. Many of the previous owners are now employed as individual property managers. These manag. ers are given significant flexibility in decision making, allowing them to negotiate purchases with suppliers and develop property marketing plans. Managers are rewarded for exceeding self-developed return-on investment goalswith company stock options. Some managers have become significant shareholders in the company, and some managers have even recommended decisions to acquire additional real estate. However, the increased autonomy has led to compettition and price cutting among Eastern Innkeepers properties wittin the same geographic market, resulting in lower margins.
1. Would you describe Bennington Properties as having a centralized or a decentralized structure? Explain.
2. Would you describe Eastern Innkeepers as having a centralized or a decentralized structure? Discuss some of the benefits and costs of that type of structure.
3. Would hotels in each chain be considered cost centers, revenue centers, profit centers, or investment centers? How does that tie into the evaluation of property managers?
4. Assume that Host Hotels chooses to acquire Eastern Innkeepers. What steps can the management of Host Hotels take to improve goal congruence between property managers and the larger company?

Sana Riaz
Sana Riaz
Numerade Educator
01:22

Problem 19

Calgary Lumber has a raw lumber division and a finished lumber division. The variable costs are as follows:
$\bullet$Raw lumber division: 125 dollar per 100 board-feet of raw lumber
$\bullet$Finished lumber division: 145 dollar per 100 board-feet of finished lumber
Assume that there is no board-feet loss in processing raw lumber into finished lumber. Raw lumber can be sold at 175 dollar per 100 board-feet. Finished lumber can be sold at 345 dollar per 100 board-feet.
1. Should Calgary Lumber process raw lumber into its finished form? Show your calculations.
2. Assume that internal transfers are made at $130 \%$ of variable cost. Will each division maximize its division operating-income contribution by adopting the action that is in the best interest of Calgary Lumber as a whole? Explain.
3. Assume that internal transfers are made at market prices. Will each division maximize its division operating-income contribution by adopting the action that is in the best interest of Calgary Lumber as a whole? Explain.

AG
Ankit Gupta
Numerade Educator
07:32

Problem 20

Tech Friendly Computer, Inc., with headquarters in San Francisco, manufactures and sells a desktop computer. Tech Friendly has three divisions, each of which is located in a different country:
a. China division-manufactures memory devices and keyboards
b. South Korea division- assembles desktop computers using locally manufactured parts, along with memory devices and keyboards from the China division
c. U.S. division-packages and distributes desktop computers
Each division is run as a profit center. The costs for the work done in each division for a single desktop computer are as follows:
$\bullet$Chinese income tax rate on the China division's operating income: $40 \%$
$\bullet$South Korean income tax rate on the South Korea division's operating income: $20 \%$
$\bullet$U.S. income tax rate on the U.S. division's operating income: $30 \%$
Each desktop computer is sold to retail outlets in the United States for 3,800 dollars. Assume that the current foreign exchange rates are as follows: $\begin{aligned} 9 \text { yuan } &= 1 \text { U.S. } \text{dollar} \\ 1,000 \text { won } &= 1 \text { U.S. } \text{dollar}\end{aligned}$
Both the China and the South Korea divisions sell part of their production under a private label. The China division sells the comparable memory/keyboard package used in each Tech Friendly desktop computer to a Chinese manufacturer for 4,500 yuan. The South Korea division sells the comparable desktop computer to a South Korean distributor for 1,340,000 won.
1. Calculate the after-tax operating income per unit earned by each division under the following transferpricing methods: (a) market price, (b) $200 \%$ of full cost, and (c) $350 \%$ of variable cost. (Income taxes are not included in the computation of the cost-based transfer prices.)
2. Which transfer-pricing method(s) will maximize the after-tax operating income per unit of Tech Friendly Computer?

Manasvee Singh
Manasvee Singh
Numerade Educator
06:13

Problem 21

$(\mathrm{CMA}, \text { adapted). }$ Quest Motors, Inc., operates as a decentralized multidivision company. The Vivo division of Quest Motors purchases most of its airbags from the airbag division. The airbag division's incremental cost for manufacturing the airbags is 90 dollarper unit. The airbag division is currently working at $80 \%$ of capacity. The current market price of the airbags is 125 dollar per unit.
1. Using the general guideline presented in the chapter, what is the minimum price at which the airbag division would sell airbags to the Vivo division?
2. Suppose that Quest Motors requires that whenever divisions with unused capacity sell products internally, they must do so at the incremental cost. Evaluate this transfer-pricing policy using the criteria of goal congruence, evaluating division performance, motivating management effort, and preserving division autonomy.
3. If the two divisions were to negotiate a transfer price, what is the range of possible transfer prices? Evaluate this negotiated transfer-pricing policy using the criteria of goal congruence, evaluating division performance, motivating management effort, and preserving division autonomy.
4. Instead of allowing negotiation, suppose that Quest specifies a hybrid transfer price that "splits the difference" between the minimum and maximum prices from the divisions' standpoint. What would be the resulting transfer price for airbags?

Abhishek Jana
Abhishek Jana
Numerade Educator
14:22

Problem 22

The Burton Company manufactures chainsaws at its plant in Sandusky, Ohio. The company has marketing divisions throughout the world. A Burton marketing division in Lille, France, imports 200,000 chainsaws annually from the United States. The following information is available:
Suppose the United States and French tax authorities only allow transfer prices that are between the full manufacturing cost per unit of 175 dollar and a market price of 250 dollar, based on comparable imports into France. The French import duty is charged on the price at which the product is transferred into France. Any import duty paid to the French authorities is a deductible expense for calculating French income taxes.
1. Calculate the after-tax operating income earned by the United States and French divisions from transferring 200,000 chainsaws (a) at full manufacturing cost per unit and (b) at market price of comparable imports. (Income taxes are not included in the computation of the cost-based transfer prices.
2. Which transfer price should the Burton Company select to minimize the total of company import duties and income taxes? Remember that the transfer price must be between the full manufacturing cost per unit of 175 dollar and the market price of 250 dollar of comparable imports into France. Explain your reasoning.

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator
14:22

Problem 23

Suppose that the U.S. division could sell as many chainsaws as it makes at 225 dollar per unit in the U.S. market, net of all marketing and distribution costs.
1. From the viewpoint of the Burton Company as a whole, would after-tax operating income be maximized if it sold the 200,000 chainsaws in the United States or in France? Show your computations.
2. Suppose division managers act autonomously to maximize their division's after-tax operating income. Will the transfer price calculated in requirement 2 in Exercise 22-22 result in the U.S. division manager taking the actions determined to be optimal in requirement 1 of this exercise? Explain.
3. What is the minimum transfer price that the U.S. division manager would agree to? Does this transfer price result in the Burton Company as a whole paying more import duty and taxes than the answer to requirement 2 in Exercise 22-22? If so, by how much?

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator
02:39

Problem 24

The Kelly-Elias Corporation, manufacturer of tractors and other heavy farm equipment, is organized along decentralized product lines, with each manufacturing division operating as a separate profit center. Each division manager has been delegated full authority on all decisions involving the sale of that division's output both to outsiders and to other divisions of Kelly-Elias. Division $C$ has in the past always purchased its requirement of a particular tractor-engine component from division A. However, when informed that division $A$ is increasing its selling price to 135 dollar, division C's manager decides to purchase the engine component from external suppliers.
Division $C$ can purchase the component for 115 dollar per unit in the open market. Division $A$ insists that, because of the recent installation of some highly specialized equipment and the resulting high depreciation charges, it will not be able to earn an adequate return on its investment unless it raises its price. Division A's manager appeals to top management of Kelly-Elias for support in the dispute with division $\mathrm{C}$ and supplies the following operating data:
1. Assume that there are no alternative uses for internal facilities of division A. Determine whether the company as a whole will benefit if division $C$ purchases the component from external suppliers for 115 dollar per unit. What should the transfer price for the component be set at so that division managers acting in their own divisions' best interests take actions that are also in the best interest of the company as a whole?
2. Assume that internal facilities of division A would not otherwise be idle. By not producing the 1,900 units for division $\mathrm{C}$, division A's equipment and other facilities would be used for other production operations that would result in annual cash-operating savings of 22,800 dollar. Should division $C$ purchase from external suppliers? Show your computations.
3. Assume that there are no alternative uses for division A's internal facilities and that the price from outsiders drops 15 dollar. Should division $C$ purchase from external suppliers? What should the transfer price for the component be set at so that division managers acting in their own divisions' best interests take actions that are also in the best interest of the company as a whole?

Nick Johnson
Nick Johnson
Numerade Educator
02:16

Problem 25

Refer to Exercise $22-24 .$ Assume that division $A$ can sell the 1,900 units to other customers at 137 dollar per unit, with variable marketing cost of 2 dollar per unit.
Determine whether Kelly-Elias will benefit if division C purchases the 1,900 units from external suppliers at 115 dollar per unit. Show your computations.

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator
13:02

Problem 26

The Slate Company manufactures and sells television sets. Its assembly division (AD) buys television screens from the screen division (SD) and assembles the TV sets. The SD, which is operating at capacity, incurs an incremental manufacturing cost of 65 dollar per screen. The SD can sell all its output to the outside market at a price of 100 dollar per screen, after incurring a variable marketing and distribution cost of 8 dollar per screen. If the $A D$ purchases screens from outside suppliers at a price of 100 dollar per screen, it will incur a variable purchasing cost of 7 dollar per screen. Slate's division managers can act autonomously to maximize their own division's operating income.
1. What is the minimum transfer price at which the SD manager would be willing to sell screens to the AD?
2. What is the maximum transfer price at which the AD manager would be willing to purchase screens from the SD?
3. Now suppose that the SD can sell only $70 \%$ of its output capacity of 20,000 screens per month on the open market. Capacity cannot be reduced in the short run. The AD can assemble and sell more than $20,000 \mathrm{TV}$ sets per month.
a. What is the minimum transfer price at which the SD manager would be willing to sell screens to the AD?
b. From the point of view of Slate's management, how much of the SD output should be transferred to the AD?
c. If Slate mandates the SD and AD managers to "split the difference" on the minimum and maximum transfer prices they would be willing to negotiate over, what would be the resulting transfer price? Does this price achieve the outcome desired in requirement $3 b ?$

Lindsay Bur
Lindsay Bur
Numerade Educator
00:01

Problem 27

Mountaineer, Inc., has two divisions, $A$ and $B$, that manufacture expensive bicycles. Division $A$ produces the bicycle frame, and division $\mathrm{B}$ assembles the rest of the bicycle onto the frame. There is a market for both the subassembly and the final product. Each division has been designated as a profit center. The transfer price for the subassembly has been set at the long-run average market price. The following data are available for each division:
The manager of division B has made the following calculation:
1. Should transfers be made to division $\mathrm{B}$ if there is no unused capacity in division $\mathrm{A} ?$ Is the market price the correct transfer price? Show your computations.
2. Assume that division A's maximum capacity for this product is 2,000 units per month and sales to the intermediate market are now 1,200 units. Assume that for a variety of reasons, division A will maintain the 160 dollar selling price indefinitely. That is, division $A$ is not considering lowering the price to outsiders even if idle capacity exists. Should 800 units be transferred to division $\mathrm{B}$ ? At what transfer price?
3. Suppose division A quoted a transfer price of 110 dollar for up to 800 units. What would be the contribution to the company as a whole if a transfer were made? As manager of division $\mathrm{B}$, would you be inclined to buy at 110 dollar? Explain.
4. Suppose the manager of division A has the option of (a) cutting the external price to 156 dollar, with the certainty that sales will rise to 2,000 units, or (b) maintaining the external price of 160 dollar for the 1,200 units and transferring the 800 units to division $\mathrm{B}$ at a price that would produce the same operating income for division A. What transfer price would produce the same operating income for division A? Is that price consistent with that recommended by the general guideline in the chapter so that the resulting decision would be desirable for the company as a whole?

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator
05:03

Problem 28

Cran Health Products is a cranberry cooperative that operates two divisions, a harvesting division and a processing division. Currently, all of harvesting's output is converted into cranberry juice by the processing division, and the juice is sold to large beverage companies that produce cranberry juice blends. The processing division has a yield of 500 gallons of juice per 1,000 pounds of cranberries. cost and market price data for the two divisions are as follows:
1. Compute Cran Health's operating income from harvesting 480,000 pounds of cranberries during June 2017 and processing them into juice.
2. Cran Health rewards its division managers with a bonus equal to $6 \%$ of operating income. Compute the bonus earned by each division manager in June 2017 for each of the following transfer-pricing methods:
a. $225 \%$ of full cost
b. Market price
3. Which transfer-pricing method will each division manager prefer? How might Cran Health resolve any conflicts that may arise on the issue of transfer pricing?

Swati Agarwal
Swati Agarwal
Numerade Educator
01:33

Problem 29

Assume that Pat Borges, CEO of Cran Health, had mandated a transfer price equal to $225 \%$ of full cost. Now he decides to decentralize some management decisions and sends around a memo that states the following: "Effective immediately, each division of Cran Health is free to make its own decisions regarding the purchase of direct materials and the sale of finished products."
1. Give an example of a goal-congruence problem that will arise if Cran Health continues to use a transfer price of $225 \%$ of full cost and Borges's decentralization policy is adopted.
2. Borges feels that a dual transfer-pricing policy will improve goal congruence. He suggests that transfers out of the harvesting division be made at $225 \%$ of full cost and transfers into the processing division be made at market price. Compute the operating income of each division under this dual transfer-pricing method when 480,000 pounds of cranberries are harvested during June 2017 and processed into juice.
3. Why is the sum of the division operating incomes computed in requirement 2 different from Cran Health's operating income from harvesting and processing 480,000 pounds of cranberries?
4. Suggest two problems that may arise if Cran Health implements the dual transfer prices described in requirement 2.

Jennifer Stoner
Jennifer Stoner
Numerade Educator
00:01

Problem 30

Express Grow Inc., based in Ankeny, lowa, sells high-end fertilizers. Express Grow has two divisions:
$\bullet$North Italy mining division, which mines potash in northern Italy
$\bullet$U.S. processing division, which uses potash in manufacturing top-grade fertilizer
The processing division's yield is $50 \%$ : It takes 2 tons of raw potash to produce 1 ton of top-grade fertilizer. Although all of the mining division's output of 8,000 tons of potash is sent for processing in the United States, there is also an active market for potash in Italy. The foreign exchange rate is 0.80 Euro $= 1$ U.S. dollar. The following information is known about the two divisions:
1. Compute the annual pretax operating income, in U.S. dollars, of each division under the following transfer-pricing methods: (a) $150 \%$ of full cost and (b) market price.
2. Compute the after-tax operating income, in U.S. dollars, for each division under the transfer-pricing methods in requirement 1. (Income taxes are not included in the computation of cost-based transfer price, and Express Grow does not pay U.S. income tax on income already taxed in Italy.)
3. If the two division managers are compensated based on after-tax division operating income, which transfer-pricing method will each prefer? Which transfer-pricing method will maximize the total after$\operatorname{tax}$ operating income of Express Grow?
4. In addition to tax minimization, what other factors might Express Grow consider in choosing a transferpricing method?

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator
02:34

Problem 31

Ballantine Corp. produces and sells lead crystal glassware. The firm consists of two divisions, Commercial and Specialty. The Commercial division manufactures 300,000 glasses per year. It incurs variable manufacturing costs of 8 dollar per unit and annual fixed manufacturing costs of 900,000 dollar. The Commercial division sells 100,000 units externally at a price of 12 dollar each, mostly to department stores. It transfers the remaining 200,000 units internally to the Specialty division, which modifies the units, adds an etched design, and sells them directly to consumers online.
Ballantine Corp. has adopted a market-based transfer-pricing policy. For each glass it receives from the Commercial division, the Specialty division pays the weighted-average external price the Commercial division charges its customers outside the company. The current transfer price is accordingly set at 12 dollar.
Eileen McCarthy, the manager of the Commercial division, receives an offer from Home Décor, a chain of upscale home furnishings stores. Home Décor offers to buy 20,000 glasses at a price of 9 dollar each, knowing that the entire lead crystal industry (including Ballantine Corp.) has excess capacity at this time. The variable manufacturing cost to the Commercial division for the units Home Décor is requesting is 8 dollar, and there are no additional costs associated with this offer. Accepting Home Décor's offer would not affect the current price of 12 dollar charged to existing external customers.
1. Calculate the Commercial division's current annual level of profit (without the new order).
2. Compute the change in the Commercial division's profit if it accepts Home Décor's offer. Will Eileen McCarthy accept this offer if her aim is to maximize the Commercial division's profit?
3. Would the top management of Ballantine Corp. want the Commercial division to accept the offer? Compute the change in firm-wide profit associated with Home Décor's offer.

Natalie Britton
Natalie Britton
Numerade Educator
01:02

Problem 32

Beacon, a division of Libra Corporation, is located in the United States. Its effective income tax rate is $30 \%$. Another division of Libra, Falcon, is located in Canada, where the income tax rate is $40 \% .$ Falcon manufactures, among other things, an intermediate product for Beacon called XPS-2022. Falcon operates at capacity and makes 15,000 units of $X P S-2022$ for Beacon each period, at a variable cost of 28 dollar per unit. Assume that there are no outside customers for XPS-2022. Because the XPS-2022 must be shipped from Canada to the United States, it costs Falcon an additional 4 dollar per unit to ship the $\mathrm{XPS}-2022$ to Beacon. There are no direct fixed costs for $\mathrm{XPS}-2022 .$ Falcon also manufactures other products.
A product similar to XPS-2022 that Beacon could use as a substitute is available in the United States for 38.50 dollar per unit.
1. What is the minimum and maximum transfer price that would be acceptable to Beacon and Falcon for XPS-2022, and why?
2. What transfer price would minimize income taxes for Libra Corporation as a whole? Would Beacon and Falcon want to be evaluated on operating income using this transfer price?
3. Suppose Libra uses the transfer price from requirement 2 and each division is evaluated on its own after-tax division operating income. Now suppose Falcon has an opportunity to sell 8,000 units of $X P S$ 2022 to an outside customer for 31 dollar each. Falcon will not incur shipping costs because the customer is nearby and offers to pay for shipping. Assume that if Falcon accepts the special order, Beacon will have to buy 8,000 units of the substitute product in the United States at 38.50 dollar per unit.
a. Will accepting the special order maximize after-tax operating income for Libra Corporation as a whole?
b. Will Beacon want Falcon to accept this special order? Why or why not?
c. Will Falcon want to accept this special order? Explain.
d. Suppose Libra Corporation wants to operate in a decentralized manner. What transfer price should Libra set for $\mathrm{XPS}-2022$ so that each division acting in its own best interest takes actions with respect to the special order that are in the best interests of Libra Corporation as a whole?

Kratika Bhadauria
Kratika Bhadauria
Numerade Educator
08:27

Problem 33

Cocoa Mill Chocolates manufactures specialty chocolates and sells them to fine candy stores. The company operates two divisions, cocoa and candy, as decentralized entities. The cocoa division purchases raw cacao beans and processes them into cocoa powder. The candy division purchases cocoa powder and other ingredients and uses them to produce gourmet chocolates. The cocoa division is free to sell processed cocoa to outside buyers, and the candy division is free to purchase processed cocoa from other sources. Currently, however, the cocoa division sells all of its output to the candy division, and the candy division does not purchase materials from outside suppliers.
The processed cocoa is transferred from the cocoa division to the production division at $110 \%$ of full cost. The cocoa division purchases raw cacao beans for 4 dollar per pound. The cocoa division uses 1.25 pounds of raw cacao beans to produce one pound of processed cocoa. The division's other variable costs equal 1.25 dollar per pound of output, and fixed costs at a monthly production level of 20,000 pounds of cocoa are 0.75 dollar per pound. During the most recent month, 20,000 pounds of processed cocoa were transferred between the two divisions. The cocoa division's capacity is 25,000 pounds of output.
With the increase in demand for dark chocolate, the candy production division expects to use 22,000 pounds of cocoa next month. Franklin Foods has offered to sell 2,000 pounds of cocoa next month to the candy production division for 7.50 dollar per pound.
1. Compute the transfer price per pound of processed cocoa. If each division is considered a profit center, would the candy production manager choose to purchase 2,000 pounds next month from Franklin Foods?
2. What would be the cost to Cocoa Mill Chocolates if the 2,000 pounds had been produced by the cocoa division and transferred to the candy division? Is the external purchase in the best interest of Cocoa Mill Chocolates? What is the cause of this goal incongruence?
3. The candy division manager suggests that $\$ 7.50$ is now the market price for processed cocoa, and that this should be the new transfer price. Cocoa Mill's corporate management tends to agree. The cocoa division manager is suspicious. Franklin's prices have always been much higher than 7.50 dollar per pound. Why the sudden price cut? After further investigation by the cocoa division manager, it is revealed that the 7.50 dollar per pound price was a one-time-only offer made to the candy division due to excess inventory at Franklin. Future orders would be priced at 8.00 dollar per pound. Comment on the validity of the 7.50 dollar per pound market price and the ethics of the candy manager. Would changing the transfer price to 7.50 dollar matter to Cocoa Mill Chocolates?

Jacquelyn Trost
Jacquelyn Trost
Numerade Educator
04:25

Problem 34

The Croydon division of CC Industries supplies the Hauser division with 100,000 units per month of an infrared LED that Hauser uses in a remote control device it sells. The transfer price of the LED is 8 dollar, which is the market price. However, Croydon does not operate at or near capacity. The variable cost to Croydon of the LED is 4.80 dollar, while Hauser incurs variable costs (excluding the transfer price) of 12 dollar for each remote control. Hauser's selling price is 32 dollar.
Hauser's manager is considering a promotional campaign. The market research department of Hauser has developed the following estimates of additional monthly volume associated with additional monthly promotional expenses.
1. What level of additional promotional expenses would the Hauser division manager choose?
2. As the manager of the Croydon division, what level of additional promotional expenses would you like to see the Hauser division manager select?
3. As the president of CC Industries, what level of spending would you like the Hauser division manager to select?
4. What is the maximum transfer price that would induce the Hauser division to spend the optimal additional promotional expense from the standpoint of the firm as a whole?

Amany Waheeb
Amany Waheeb
Numerade Educator
13:02

Problem 35

Letang Company has three divisions (R, S, and T), organized as decentralized profit centers. Division $\mathrm{R}$ produces the basic chemical Ranbax, in multiples of 1,000 pounds, and transfers it to divisions $\mathrm{S}$ and $\mathrm{T}$. Division $\mathrm{S}$ processes Ranbax into the final product Syntex, and division T processes Ranbax into the final product Termix. No material is lost during processing.
Division R has no fixed costs. The variable cost per pound of Ranbax is 0.18 dollar. Division $\mathrm{R}$ has a capacity limit of 10,000 pounds. Divisions $S$ and $T$ have capacity limits of 4,000 and 6,000 pounds, respectively. Divisions $\mathrm{S}$ and $\mathrm{T}$ sell their final product in separate markets. The company keeps no inventories of any kind.
The cumulative net revenues (i.e., total revenues - total processing costs) for divisions $S$ and $T$ at various output levels are summarized below.
1. Suppose there is no external market for Ranbax. What quantity of Ranbax should the Letang Company produce to maximize overall income? How should this quantity be allocated between the two processing divisions?
2. What range of transfer prices will motivate divisions $S$ and $T$ to demand the quantities that maximize overall income (as determined in requirement $1)$, as well as motivate division $\mathrm{R}$ to produce the sum of those quantities?
3. Suppose that division $\mathrm{R}$ can sell any quantity of Ranbax in a perfectly competitive market for 0.33 dollar $\mathrm{a}$ pound. To maximize Letang's income, how many pounds of Ranbax should division $\mathrm{R}$ transfer to divisions $\mathrm{S}$ and $\mathrm{T}$, and how much should it sell in the external market?
4. What range of transfer prices will result in divisions $\mathrm{R}$, $\mathrm{S}$, and $\mathrm{T}$ taking the actions determined as optimal in requirement 3? Explain your answer.

Lindsay Bur
Lindsay Bur
Numerade Educator
05:44

Problem 36

Compost Systems, Inc. (CSI) operates a composting service business and produces organic fertilizer that it sells to farmers in the Midwest. CSI operates with two divisions, collection and composting. The collection division contracts with universities, hospitals, and other large institutions to provide compostable waste collection bins in their dining service areas, and hauls the waste away daily. The waste providers pay the collection division a monthly fee for this service, and the collection division in turn charges the composting division for the compostable materials at a full-cost transfer price of 200 dollar per ton. Monthly, CSI collects and transfers 1,000 tons of waste.
The composting division processes the waste, places it in bins, adds microbes to break down the organic material, and ultimately delivers the fertilizer it produces to farmers for use in their fields. After the removal of water, 1,000 tons of waste produces 500 tons of fertilizer. Demand for the fertilizer has risen steeply as consumer demand for organic produce has increased in recent years.
Below are key data related to CSl's monthly operations:
The composting division has demand for an additional 200 tons of fertilizer per month. To provide the 400 tons of compostable waste necessary to meet the increased demand, the collection division will have to invest in additional marketing and equipment that will increase monthly fixed costs by 28,000 dollar. Estimated additional monthly revenue to the collection division from waste providers is 10,000 dollar.
1. Compute the new full-cost transfer price if it is applied to all waste transferred to the composting division.
2. Compute the new full-cost transfer price if it is applied to just the additional 400 tons.
3. What difficulties do you see in using a full-cost transfer-pricing system in the future?
4. The composting division has identified a source of additional compostable waste at a price of 205 dollar per ton. What would be the impact on the company as a whole if the 400 tons of material is purchased from the outside supplier? As a decentralized unit, what decision would the composting division make regarding the additional material?
5. Would a market-based transfer price be agreeable to both divisional managers?

ES
Eugene Schneider
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
42:33

Problem 37

(J. Patell, adapted) Sierra Inc. consists of a semiconductor division and a process-control division, each of which operates as an independent profit center. The semiconductor division employs craftsmen who produce two different electronic components: the new highperformance Xcel-chip and an older product called the Dcel-chip. These products have the following cost characteristics:
Due to the high skill level necessary for the craftsmen, the semiconductor division's capacity is set at 55,000 hours per year.
Maximum demand for the Xcel-chip is 13,750 units annually, at a price of 130 dollar per chip. There is unlimited demand for the Dcel-chip at 65 dollar per chip.
The process-control division produces only one product, a process-control unit, with the following cost structure:
$\bullet$Direct materials (circuit board): 80 dollar
$\bullet$Direct manufacturing labor (3.5 $\text { hours }$ times 10 dollar): 35 dollar
The current market price for the control unit is 125 dollar per unit.
A joint research project has just revealed that a single $X$ cel-chip could be substituted for the circuit board currently used to make the process-control unit. The direct manufacturing labor cost of the processcontrol unit would be unchanged. The improved process-control unit could be sold for 185 dollar.
1. Calculate the contribution margin per direct-labor hour of selling Xcel-chip and Dcel-chip. If no transfers of Xcel-chip are made to the process-control division, how many Xcel-chips and Dcel-chips should the semiconductor division manufacture and sell? What would be the division's annual contribution margin? Show your computations.
2. The process-control division expects to sell 1,250 process-control units this year. From the viewpoint of Sierra Inc. as a whole, should $1,250 \mathrm{Xcel}$ -chips be transferred to the process-control division to replace circuit boards? Show your computations.
3. What transfer price, or range of prices, would ensure goal congruence among the division managers? Show your calculations.
4. If labor capacity in the semiconductor division were 60,000 hours instead of 55,000 , would your answer to requirement 3 differ? Show your calculations.

Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Oluwadamilola Ameobi
Numerade Educator