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State Immunity and Personal Immunity in International Law

a) Whether Leia can rely on the 'commercial transactions' exception in s.3 State Immunity Act in suing Coruscant for breach of contract. Because the arrangement is a contract for the provision of services (s.3(3)(a)), Leia can invoke the 'commercial transactions' exception. The fact that the purpose of the transaction is clearly governmental is generally immaterial as held by the House of Lords in I Congreso del Partido. The best answers contrasted the approach in English law with that followed by the 2004 UN Convention, which allows for recourse to the purpose of the transaction in certain cases. The question indicated that the breach of contract was prompted by Coruscant adopting a bill. This raises the question whether the default was an act that only a State could perform, in which case immunity would attach per Lord Wilberforce in I Congreso del Partido (decided on the basis of pre-Act common law). Incidentally, the bill did not seek to annul the contract but only to prevent its performance. A significant number of candidates noted that if the contract had been concluded in the territory of Coruscant and was governed by Coruscant's administrative law (the facts are silent on both points), the 'exception to the exception' in s. 2(3) could apply. (b) Whether the UK may prosecute the Defence Minister for the crime committed against Leia. Given that s.20 SIA only extends the provisions of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 to Heads of State, the question was whether Minister Darth enjoy immunities under customary international law that can be applied as a matter of English law (Triquet v Bath; Trendtex). It could be argued following the ICJ's reasoning in Arrest Warrant that the personal immunity of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be extended by analogy to other high-ranking officials representing the State because they require immunity to effectively perform their functions. In English law, Mofaz extended personal immunities to the Defence Minister, but the best answers noted that a factor against such extension in this case was that Minister Darth visited the UK for personal reasons. If personal immunity cannot be invoked, neither can immunity ratione materiae: The Stormtroopers beat up Leia in the Minister's home over an informal dinner. About half of the candidates began their analysis by discussing as a preliminary issue whether the UK would have jurisdiction under international law over a crime committed in Coruscant. They noted the progressive acceptance of the passive personality principle but only a few noted that the crime in question did not fall under the well-established categories of passive personality crimes - unless the assault crossed the threshold of torture. Extra points were given to candidates who contrasted Mofaz with the ICJ's position in Djibouti v France and the ILC in its ongoing work. Both indicate that the Defense Minister does not enjoy personal immunity under IL and should not, as such, enjoy personal immunity under English law, regardless of what the Magistrate's Court said in Mofaz.