Received: 14 February 2017 Revised: 4 May 2017 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12437 Accepted: 27 June 2017 ARTICLE WILEY What is implicit bias ?* Jules Holroyd (D | Robin Scaife | Tom Stafford The University of Sheffield Correspondence Dr. Jules Holroyd, Department of Philosophy, The University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria Street, S3 7QB Sheffield, UK. Email: j.d.holroyd@sheffield.ac.uk Funding information Leverhulme Trust, Grant/Award Number: RPG- 2013-326 Abstract Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the develop- ment of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions are in fact being mea- sured; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices. 17479991, 2017, 10, Downloaded from https:/compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phe3.12437 by Queen'S University, Wiley Online Library on [01/11/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 1 | INTRODUCTION Research programmes in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identi- fying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions are in fact being measured; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices. First, let us get some paradigm cases of the phenomena at issue on the table. *This paper was produced as part of a Leverhulme Trust research project grant on Bias and Blame (RPG-2013-326). We are grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for their support. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -