Question 1a. Xenon's interest is unregistered. In this case, Xenon's lease is for a term of 3 years and contains options to renew. Since the lease does not exceed 3 years, registration is not mandatory. Furthermore, the lease is written and signed by the lessor, this create the legal interest in land: s 11(1)(a) PLA. Here, the lease is written, and thus fulfils the requirements of ss 11, 59 PLA and has a defined term. The facts suggests that the lease contains a clause requiring the lessee not assign or sublet without consent. At common law, the lessee's breach may give rise to a right to terminate the contract underlying the lease: Progressive Mailing House v Tabali. Here, it is clear that there is a forfeiture clause within the lease and that Xenon has breached the covenant not to assign or sublet without consent. Therefore, it is advisable for Anna to provide notice complying with s 124 PLA. Anna could seek contractual and equitable remedies, including specific performance. This means Anna would be successful in bringing Xenon's lease to an end. Question 1b. The fact that Faith's lease is not registered does not invalidate the lease itself. The lease remains valid and enforceable between the parties involved, as it is supported by a written agreement signed by both parties. Whether the arrangements made by Faith and Jayce comprised leases or licences is a question of the construction of the contract. The fact the agreement refers to a 'licence' is not determinative. Radaich v Smith. The test to distinguish a lease from a licence is whether or not what is granted in the contract is exclusive possession: Radaich v Smith. If exclusive possession is granted, then it is a lease. A license typically grants a person permission to use a specific area or property for a specific purpose, without transferring any interest in the property. The nature of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances can be assessed to determine this. Here, Faith has allowed Jayce to use a walled-off section within Premises 2. It is important to note that Jayce's section has separate access to the street, implying that it is physically distinct from the main dry-cleaning business area. This arrangement suggests that Jayce's use of the section may fall within the scope of a license, rather than a sublease. Furthermore, Faith retains control over the premises and has the ability to monitor arrivals and access Jayce's section for cleaning purposes. Jayce's section is locked and accessible only with a key, further indicating a license arrangement where Jayce is granted permission to use the space without exclusive possession or control. Additionally, Jayce's use of the section as an art space for $100 per week, which is market value for a space of that size, suggests a payment for the permission to use the space rather than a rental payment for a sublease. Therefore, Faith would not be in breach of her lease, as the arrangement between her and Jayce is a