Presentation - 2010 1. Stephan Fruhling's article 'Never say never: Considerations about the possibility of Aus. acquiring nuclear weapons' introduces the idea that due to the global shift in power, alongside other considerable factors, the world has drastically changed from 50 or so years ago when Australia signed the NPT in 1968, and thus proposed 3 main legitimate reasons in which why Australia may consider the use of nuclear weapons. 2. Australia's decision to choose not to have nuclear weapons began with its expectations from allied forces, whom were supported by nuclear weapons under US/UK control, to protect Australia from threats abroad. This level of 'nuclear deterrence' enabled the Australian government to feel safe enough to not deem it necessary to invest into nuclear capabilities. 3. Throughout this article, Fruhling states three driving forces that act as key considerations for Australia acquiring nuclear weapons. The first driving force is the 'perception of a major threat'. Fruhling explains that if a perception of a major threat or a major risk of such threat is developing, the Australian government may be willing to act to protect itself. However, for Australia to even consider the need of nuclear weapons, there needs to be different types of existential threats that need to be distinguished, first being the development of a hostile power. To make these threats credible, the power would have to overwhelm Australia's conventional defense effort. Furthermore, the perception of a major threat from abroad would raise domestic support resulting in a heavy increase for a rapid and significant expenditure in defense outlays, and since politicians are serving its constitutes, the demand for Australia to be equipped with Nuclear weapons would increase, where the term 'going nuclear' could well be an explicit election promise and be used as a central feature for the oppositions political campaign.
4. The second driving force, as Fruhling states is the Loss of Confidence in US Extended Deterrence. The primary issue surrounding this driving force is if that America chooses not to intervene due to future consequences that may occur for themselves (being the US). Take for example ....... Fruhling argues that Australian faith in US extended deterrence could be shaken if the opposing country openly disregards US threats, followed by US retaliating for an attack against one of its allies, which significantly diminishes the US's 'extended deterrence', and thus strengthen the case for an Australian nuclear weapons program. The same argument can be used if the US failed to act to protect its allies, the case for sovereignty rather than relying on the US's extended deterrence would instantly become much stronger and thus yet again increase the credibility of a Australian nuclear weapons acquisition. 5. The third and final condition Fruhling discusses is the allied acquiescence (reluctant acceptance) to Australian Nuclear Weapons. Australia in its entirety relies on the use of advanced technologies to assist with defending its 25,000km of coastline. It relies on close access to overseas technology, weapons systems, logistics resupply, satellite communications and intelligence,