Mearshimer's article The False Promise of International Institutions', goes into depth about the definition and effectiveness of international institutions and institutionalist theories, with A particular focus on examining the claim that institutions push states away from war and promote peace. He introduces the concept of international institutions as standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations which prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviour and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behaviour. These institutions are typically formalised in international agreements embodies in organisations with the aim of promoting more durable European security. He makes note of the fact that "institutionalist" theories are largely a response to realism with each directly challenging the underlying logic behind realism. From a realist perspective, institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the international arena and can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how every move affects their relative power positions. According to Mearshimer, realist are able to recognise that states sometimes operate through institutions. However, they believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self- interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. Within a realist world, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war whereas institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process. This is evident through the establishment of NATO where it was the balance of power that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continents ultimately acting as an American tool for managing power in the face of Soviet threat rather than the institution itself maintaining peace Mearshimer goes on to explain the 3 main varieties of institutionalist theories; Liberal Institutionalism; Collective Security and Critical Theory. Liberal institutionalism is a theory largely ignores security issues and concentrates instead on economic and, to a lesser extent, environmental issues. It presents the principal obstacle to cooperation among states with mutual interests as the threat of cheating. Liberal institutionalists concentrate on showing how rules can work to counter the cheating problem rules can get states to make the short-term sacrifices needed to resolve the prisoners' dilemma and thus to realize long-term gains. Institutions, in short, can produce cooperation. However, even if one accepts liberalist institutionalism arguments about when states largely ignore relative-gains concerns, those conditions are rather uncommon in the real world. Even in circumstances where realist logic about relative gains does not apply, non-military logics like strategic trade theory might cause states to think in terms of relative gain. Ultimately, liberal institutionalism does not provide a sound basis for under- standing international relations and promoting stability in the post-Cold War world and makes modest claims about the impact of institutions, and steers clear of war and peace issues, focusing instead on the less ambitious task of explaining economic cooperation. Mearshimer then introduces the idea of collective security, which unlike liberal institutionalism directly confronts the issue of how to prevent war. It challenges realist thinking about state behaviour and substitutes it with 3 anti-realist norms
1. states should reject the idea of