S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES India's South Asian tight-rope walk Stability in Indo-Sino relations in accordance to the NFU principle S6029 Nuclear Politics in Asia Term Paper Prerna Tarika Diwaker 13-Feb-14 PONDER THE IMPROBABLE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University This paper seeks to analyse the ideology behind India's decision to subscribe to the NFU policy, irrespective of Pakistan's refusal to subscribe to the same. Consequentially, is India optimistic or pessimistic about its future relations with China, especially with regard to recent development? Despite growing trade between its belligerent adversaries, how does India feel it rational to still subscribe to the NFU? While this paper will make some reference to Pakistan, it is majorly structured to address India-China issues. The following paper talks about the nuclear instability in South Asia's nuclear triangle - the states of India, Pakistan and China. Briefly talking about the prevalent scenario in South Asia; It links the concepts of nuclear deterrence, No First Use & arms racing with respect to the Indo-Sino relationship to conclude that stability will prevail in their relationship as a result of their high interdependence.
India's South Asian tight-rope walk Stability in Indo-Sino relations in accordance to the NFU principle Prerna Tarika Diwaker Introduction India's Nuclear Doctrine evolved from being designed in 1999 from alleviating international pressure after its first nuclear test, to being a formal document in 2003 pledging "No First Use" and promising "non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states". It is widely known that India's primary deterrence strategy is targeted at China with every military development aimed to balance Beijing. By this it recognises China to be more valuable to maintain peaceful adversarial relationships in the region1. While India and China are subscribed to the No First Use Policy on the use of nuclear arsenal; Pakistan isn't. It follows an asymmetric strategy; specifically India-centric; with nuclear arsenal supplied by the Chinese2. Despite this, until today, India's preferred form of deterrence even after weaponization is through possession of non-deployed weapons in an unassembled or nearly assembled condition- concealed & not attached while warheads and delivery vehicles are also not co-located either. In this light, I seek to analyse the ideology behind India's decision to subscribe to the NFU policy, irrespective of Pakistan's refusal to subscribe to the same. Consequentially, is India optimistic or pessimistic about its future relations with China, especially with regard to recent development? Despite growing trade between its belligerent adversaries, how does India feel it rational to still subscribe to the NFU? While this paper will make some reference to Pakistan, it is majorly structured to address India-China issues. In the following paper I talk about the nuclear instability in South Asia's nuclear triangle - the states of India, Pakistan and China. Briefly talking about the prevalent scenario in South Asia; I link the concepts of nuclear deterrence, No First Use & arms racing with respect to the Indo-Sino relationship to conclude that stability will prevail in their