AUTHOR'S PROOF Philosophia DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9347-0 JrnlID 11406_ArtID 9347_Proof# 1 - 14/12/2011 Rawls and the Problem of Honour 4 Kevin W. Gray 5 Received: 11 November 2011 / Accepted: 6 December 2011 C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 ROOF 6 7 8 Abstract In this paper, I consider the difficult relationship between Rawls, religion 9 and the values that religious believers might consider important in order to lead the 10 good life. Contrary to many of Rawls' defenders, I argue that at least some of the 11 values that religious citizens are likely to hold cannot be accounted for under Rawls' 12 theory or under his conception of the good life. I argue that the model of goods which 13 Rawls takes to be part of a thin theory of the good is tied to his belief that under the 14 Original Position justice can be derived from calculations of self-interest alone. To 15 perform my critique, I consider the paradigmatic case of honour in so-called tradi- 16 tional societies. I argue that the way Rawls thematizes primary goods in A Theory of 17 Justice, including concepts like esteem, cannot account for the way honour manifests 18 itself inside traditional communities. I conclude the paper by considering how Rawls 19 might be able to defend his theory against my objection, by considering the relation- 20 ship between Rawls' theory, and the rationalization and secularization of society. 21 Keywords Rawls . Honour . Religion . Habermas . Original Position 22 23 In this paper, I will consider the problematic relationship between John Rawls' early 24 work and religion." To put my thesis simply, I believe that in A Theory of Justice 25 Rawls takes too much for granted in his discussion of the values which he assumes 26 that all members of modern society possess. In particular, Rawls neglects to consider 27 1 At the outset, I should state clearly that while the examples I chose are informed by my work in the Middle East and Central Asia, but I do not think they are exclusive to any region or religion. To understand my criticism of A Theory of Justice in that way would greatly limit the scope of the objection I am developing. My criticism of Rawls would, with appropriate substitutions, hold in any other part of the world. I wish to thank the participants at the 'Between Rawls and Religion' conference held at LUISS University and John Cabot University in Rome, including Dr. Tom Bailey for his helpful comments, and the organizers of the Faculty colloquia at Georgetown Qatar and Yeditepe, and particularly Dr. Karl Widerquist and Dr. Fiona Tomkinson for their comments. K. W. Gray ( International Studies, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates e-mail: kgray@aus.edu & Springer
Philosophia THOR'S PROQE2011 several goods that members of traditional societies (including religious believers) are 28 likely to hold dear. In this paper, I argue that either Rawls needs to broaden the types 29 of goods that actors are allowed