3. Assume that there are two players (Player 1 and Player 2) and they have strategies as \( s_{1} \) and \( s_{2} \). They have the following utility functions:
\[
\begin{array}{c}
U_{1}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=40 s_{1}-s_{1}^{2}+4 s_{1} s_{2} \\
U_{2}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=100 s_{2}-50 s_{1}-s_{2}^{2}-s_{1} s_{2}
\end{array}
\]
a. Find the Nash equilibrium if it is a static simultaneous move game.
b. Find the equilibrium if it is a dynamic sequentially move game. (The game starts with Player 1 and goes on with Player 2)
