2. Consider the following normal form game:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
& $L$ & $R$ \\
\hline
$T$ & 1,3 & 2,1 \\
$B$ & 0,5 & 4,0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
a) Solve for all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed) of the normal for game
above.
b) Now consider an extensive form game where the row player moves first,
choosing between $T$ and $B$. The column player observes the row player's
action and must choose between $L$ and $R$. The resulting payoffs are given
in the payoff matrix above.
i) Draw the game tree associated with this game.
ii) Solve for the unique backward induction strategy profile, and compare
it to the Nash equilibria you found in a)
