Problem 1
Consider a repeated game in which the following stage game is played 10 times.
Player 2
L C R
U 3, 3 5, 2 1, 4
Player 1 M 5, 1 6, 3 4, 5
D 3, 2 4, 5 3, 6
Find all (pure) subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this repeated game.
Problem 2
Consider the repeated game in which the following stage game is played twice.
Player 2
Stag Hare
Stag 2, 2 0, 1
Player 1
Hare 1, 0 1, 1
1. Is there a (pure) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in which (Hare, Stag) is
played in stage 1? If so, provide such subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a precise
format.
2. Is there a (pure) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in which (Hare, Hare) is
played in stage 1? If so, provide such subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a precise
format.