Teens A and B are smitten with each other, but neither knows of the other's feelings. Suppose the teachers at their school organize a dance. The "payoff" is based on whether their advances are rebuffed or accepted. If they both declare, they get a positive utility, but if they are rebuffed, they face humiliation (significantly negative payoff). Rebuffing an advance slightly elevates the teen's standing with peers.
Teen B
Declare
Ignore/Rebuff
Teen A
Declare
10, 10
-10, 1
Ignore/Rebuff
1, -10
0, 0
In addition to any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, there is another one in mixed strategies. In it, each teen chooses to declare with probability:
a. 0.52
b. 0.5
c. 0.34
d. 0.1
ANSWER:
a
Please explain the answer and show all the steps. Thanks.