Question 1: Problem Set 5 Question 1 d) Consider the game with t=5. In the unique Nash equilibrium, what is the probability that player 2 plays R? Round to two decimals if necessary.
Question 2: Problem Set 5, Question 2 c) Find all Nash equilibria of the game. Full points are obtained if you select all correct strategy profiles.
(u,L)
(u,M)
(u,R)
(m,L)
(m,M)
(m,R)
(d,L)
(d,M)
(d,R)
Question 3: Problem Set 5 Question 3b) Suppose α=0.20. Determine the probability with which the goalkeeper jumps into the right corner in the unique Nash equilibrium. Round to two decimals if necessary.
Question 4: Problem Set 5, Question 4c) Let K=129. Determine how many goats each villager decides to graze on the common pasture.