Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information
• There is a Son (Player 1) and a Father (Player 2)
• At the initial node $n_1$, Son chooses whether to Obey (O) or Rebel (R)
• If Son chooses O the game ends with Son, Father payoffs equal to (1,3)
• If Son chooses R, then we reach node $n_2$ Father chooses whether to Punish (P) or be Lenient (L)
• If Father chooses L the game ends with Son, Father payoffs equal to (3,0)
• If Father chooses P, then we reach node $n_3$ and Son chooses whether to Accept (A) or Fight (F)
• If Son chooses A the game ends with Son, Father payoffs equal to (2,2)
• If Son chooses F the game ends with Son, Father payoffs equal to (0,1)
Which statement is TRUE for this game?
A.
B.
C.
D.
The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are (1,3)
The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are (3,0)
The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are (2,2)
The payoffs of Son and Father in the subgame perfect equilibrium are (0,1)