Q6.
There are three voters, 1, 2 and 3. Two elections are held simultaneously. In
Election 1, voters vote over a and b, and in Election 2, they vote over x and y.
Voters' preferences are determined jointly by the outcomes of the two elections.
Each voter's preference ordering is as follows:
1: (a, x) > (a, y) > (b, x) > (b, y)
2: (b, y) > (b, x) > (a, y) > (a, x)
3: (a, y) > (b, x) > (b, y) > (a, x)
(1) What is the outcome if voters vote sincerely?
(2) Would the outcome in (1) be still the outcome if voters vote strategically?
(3) Examine whether the following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium under
strategic voting.
Election 1
Election 2
1's choice
a
x
2's choice
b
x
3's choice
b
x
