Game A: Victoria and Albert are roommates for 1 week. Each of them prefers a clean room to a dirty
room, but neither likes housecleaning. Their payoffs are as hence as follows. Derive all Nash equilibrium of
this static game A, where they decide on their actions simultaneously.
Clean Don’t Clean
Clean 5,5 2,6
Don’t Clean 6,2 3,3
(b) Game B: Suppose now, in the second week, Victoria and Albert are planning to eat out on Saturday.
They are deciding whether to have Korean BBQ or Macdonalds. They both prefer Korean BBQ to
Macdonalds, especially if they have happened to have the meal together. The payoffs are hence as follows.
Derive all Nash equilibria of this static game B, where they decide on their actions simultaneously.
BBQ Macs
BBQ 5,5 2,1
Macs 1,2 3,3
(c) Draw the extensive form of the entire game where Game B is played (in Week 2) after Game A (in Week
1), and where both of them observe perfectly, the outcome in Game A, before Game B is played. You do
not need to fill in the payoffs for now.
(Hint: first think about how to draw the extensive forms of static games A and B, then use this to draw the
extensive form of game B after game A)