3. Consider the following game:
Tallulah
L
C
R
T
Susan
1,1
0,0
5,0
M
0,0
3,3
0,0
B
0,5
0,0
4,4
a) Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibria.
b) Is there a Pareto superior outcome to the Nash equilibria? If so, what strategies should the
players play to get that outcome?
c) If the game is played two times in a row, without discounting future payoffs, is (playing B
both rounds, playing R both rounds) a Nash Equilibrium? Prove your answer by finding the
Best Response for each player to strategy listed for her opponent.
d) If the game is played two times in a row, without discounting future payoffs, is this strategy
profile a Nash Equilibrium?
(SUSAN: play B in the first round and then in the second round, play M if Tallulah
played R in the first round, but play T if Tallulah did not play R in the first round,
TALLULAH: play R in the first round and then in the second round, play C if Susan
played B in the first round, but play L if Susan did not play B in the first round,)
Prove your answer by finding the Best Response for each player to strategy listed for her
oponent.
