14. According to Hill, the reasons we foreground for being indignant about a person's indifference to uprooting the non-sentient natural environment include:
- That it robs the present and future generations of its use and enjoyment
- That animals depend on the environment
- That plants are needed to replenish the atmosphere
- All of the above
- None of the above
15. According to Hill, if the environment is for some just a resource, what reasons might we try to put forward for being morally dissatisfied with one who treats it with indifference (i.e., as a mere resource)?
- We might appeal to the rights of plants and animals and object to their violation
- We might appeal to nature as God's creation and so insist that it is not ours to manhandle at will
- We might appeal to the intuitive intrinsic goodness of nature
- All of the above
- Only two of the above
16. According to Hill, if we cannot find an adequate reason for morally condemning acts of indifference, why should we focus instead on the character of the actor committing such acts? In order to see if such a person lacks human traits we admire and regard as morally important
- if the ideal of care for non-sentient nature is connected to other virtues or human excellences
- if indifference to non-sentient nature is necessarily connected to moral vice
- All of the above
- A and B only
17. According to Hill, what on the whole might an indifference to non-sentient nature signal a lack of?
- Knowledge
- Self-acceptance
- A sense of one's place in the order of things
- An aesthetic sense
- A sense of gratitude
- All of the above
- A, C, and D only
18. According to Hill, what is the logical status of his proposed connection between an indifference to non-sentient nature and the lack of human traits and evaluative attitudes that we admire?
- There is a necessary connection
- There is an empirical connection
- Both A and B
- Neither A nor B