Each of two players announces an integer between 0 and 100. Let $a_1$ be the announcement of Player 1 and $a_2$ be the announcement of Player 2. The payoffs are determined as follows: • If $a_1 + a_2 le 100$: Player 1 receives $a_1$ and Player 2 receives $a_2$; • If $a_1 + a_2 > 100$ and $a_1 > a_2$: Player 1 receives $100 - a_2$ and Player 2 receives $a_2$; • If $a_1 + a_2 > 100$ and $a_1 < a_2$: Player 1 receives $a_1$ and Player 2 receives $100 - a_1$; • If $a_1 + a_2 > 100$ and $a_1 = a_2$: Both players receive 50. Solve this game with iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
Added by Gregory T.
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The game involves two players each choosing an integer between 0 and 100. The sum of these integers (a1 + a2) determines the payoff for each player, with different outcomes if the sum is less than or equal to 100, greater than 100 with one number higher, or Show more…
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