00:01
So a prisoner's dilemma here is a strategic situation that looks something like this, right? the idea is that if neither confesses, both do well, right? nobody confesses to the crime, and so, you know, they both let go where they get minimum sentences.
00:21
If both confess, both do poorly.
00:30
If one confesses, they do great, and the other, respectfully speaking, gets screwed, right? so the other one, right, if you confess to the crime, you get released by the police for being such a good corporate citizen and turning in your fellow conspirator, and they get thrown in jail, right? so which of these things is true, right? a, the first one is neither confesses.
01:15
This one is wrong, right? there's no guarantee here, right? there is no guarantee only a recommendation, right? we can't say what everybody's going to do.
01:29
We can only make recommendations about what is best play, right? there's no guarantee that neither will confess.
01:38
In fact, there is a strong incentive to confess, usually, right? usually the idea is to throw your partner under the bus for your own rational benefit.
01:46
B, example of co -operative equilibrium.
01:54
I'll come back to that one because it's a little bit different than the others, right? c, could do better by flipping.
02:10
Again, i'll come back to that one.
02:13
D is only one dominant strategy.
02:19
This is wrong.
02:20
It's just clearly wrong because it's symmetrical, right? both indeed have dominant.
02:29
But it's symmetrical...